Introduction
The economic costs of political conflict have long been a subject of great interest to economists. The large number of papers in this area offer ample empirical evidence that political instability has important economic consequences. However, most of the leading studies tend to focus on the implications of political instability for macroeconomic variables such as savings, investment and growth rates (see, e.g., Venieris and Gupta (1986) , Barro (1991) , Mauro (1995) , Alesina and Perotti (1996) , Abadie and Gardeazabal (2003) , and Eckstein and Tsiddon (2004) ). Relatively few papers analyze the effects of conflict on individual outcomes in particular markets, such as the labor market.
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In this paper, we contribute to the literature on the economic costs of political instability by measuring the implications of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict for Palestinian employment and earnings. 2 We quantify the conflict by the frequency of closures of the West Bank and Gaza Strip and the number of overseas foreign workers in the Israeli labor market. The number of foreign workers is related to the conflict, in addition to closures, because the importation of foreign workers is believed to have been a way for Israel to reduce its traditional reliance on Palestinian labor. The Israeli government dramatically increased its issuance of foreign worker permits to Israeli employers starting in the mid 1990s.
1 A notable exception is Angrist and Kugler (2004) , who analyze the consequences of a shift in the drug trade (and related violence) on the income of the self-employed and the labor supply of teenage boys in Columbia. 2 Other economic and political consequences of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict are examined in Berman and 3 Measuring the consequences of closures and foreign workers for Palestinian labor market outcomes is accomplished by using unique micro level panel data from the Palestinian Labor Force Survey (PLFS) of the Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics (PCBS). Data from the PLFS is combined with quarterly time series data on the number of foreign workers in Israel, and the frequency of temporary closures of the West Bank and Gaza Strip, between the years 1999 and 2004. Because the number of foreign workers in Israel in each quarter is likely to be endogenous, due to nonrandom immigration, we also compile quarterly data on the number of foreign worker permits issued by the Israeli government and use it as an instrument for the number of foreign workers in the Israeli labor market in each quarter.
The number of foreign worker permits issued by the Israeli government is likely to be a credible source of exogenous variation in the number of foreign workers employed or searching for work in the Israeli labor market each quarter because of the lags and inefficiencies in the regulatory process that governs the issuance of permits. Lags and inefficiencies create a situation whereby the number of permits issued in each quarter is not a direct result of contemporaneously rising wages or falling unemployment in Israel or its surrounding areas. We do not instrument for temporary closures of the West Bank and Gaza Strip since closures are mostly a consequence of surges in the IsraeliPalestinian conflict that have little to do with the unobserved determinants of Palestinian labor demand (see Angrist (1996) ).
Exploiting the panel aspect of the PLFS and using the number of foreign workers permits Laitin (2005) , Berrebi and Klor (2005) , and Jaeger and Paserman (2005) . The estimated employment and earnings effects of temporary closures and foreign workers suggest that the Israeli-Palestinian conflict leads to substantially worse labor market outcomes for Palestinians both in the short-run and in the long-run. The impact of foreign workers is relatively stronger than the impact of temporary closures because the former more closely corresponds to a permanent, long-run labor substitution effect. The closure effect captures only a transitory short-run restriction on Palestinian labor supply.
However, the two effects are not independent. Foreign workers become increasingly more attractive over time as permanent substitutes for Palestinians as temporary closures lead to short-term but frequent Palestinian absenteeism from workplaces in Israel. The foreign worker effect thus picks up to a certain extent the cumulative effect of temporary closures.
It is interesting to note that our estimates not only provide a measure of the labor market costs of a particular political conflict, but can also be put into the context of the literature on the economic consequences of immigration. The history of the Israeli market for unskilled labor is such that Palestinians in the Israeli labor market can be considered natives and overseas foreign workers can be considered recent immigrants. In the immigration literature, it is quite unusual to find significant negative effects of immigrants on the employment and earnings outcomes of natives (see, e.g., Borjas (1987) , Card (1990) , Altonji and Card (1991) , Pischke and Velling (1997), Friedberg 6 (2001) and Card (2001)) 3 . The lack of significant effects is usually attributed to problems associated with appropriately defining competing groups of immigrants and natives, natives responding to immigration by moving their labor and capital to other areas, and immigrants locating in growing local economies (Borjas (2003) ).
In this paper, we can reasonably overcome many of these problems. First, we are examining data that relate to two groups of workers that truly compete in the labor market. The Israeli government permitted overseas foreign workers to enter Israel with the explicit intention of replacing Palestinian laborers from the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Second, the PLFS panel data include information on the employment and earnings of individuals that work in the Israeli labor market as well as in the local Palestinian economy, to which they are most likely to move their labor after displacement by foreign workers. Therefore, our estimates suffer less from sample-selection biases that arise when data on the outcomes of displaced individuals are not available (see Card (2001) ). Lastly, we can credibly correct for biases due to nonrandom immigration by using government issued foreign worker entry permits as an instrument for the number of foreign workers in the Israeli labor force.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. The next section describes the PLFS panel data and provides a descriptive analysis of the PLFS as well as the data on foreign workers, foreign worker permits and closures. Section 3 outlines the empirical strategy that we employ. Section 4 discusses the estimation results. In Section 5, we illustrate the extent of sample selection bias that would have arisen had post-displacement data on Rounds of the survey prior to 1999 are not considered for several reasons. First, the 8 methodology of the sample design was substantially different before 1999. In 1995, the survey was conducted in one quarter only and it was an experimental sample. In 1996, the survey was conducted over three quarters. It wasn't until 1998, after the Palestinian census in 1997, that the survey was conducted in all four quarters of the year. Second, the percentage of individuals that contribute only one quarter of data is 65% between the years 1995 and 1998. This is in contrast to 5.6% percent during the survey years 1999 to 2004. Third, it is currently not possible to link the records of individuals that overlap the survey years 1998 and 1999. Columns (4)- (6) (4) and (5) reveals that mean monthly earnings among Palestinians that work in Israel are higher than the mean monthly earnings of Palestinians over all work locations. Thus, there is an Israeli labor market earnings premium for both residents of the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. This premium also increases over the sample period (see Angrist (1992 Angrist ( , 1995 ).
In Column (4), it is evident that mean monthly earnings regardless of work location fell (1) and (2) show that residents of Gaza are more likely to live in an urban area and a refugee camp than are residents of the West Bank. In terms of marital status, age and years of schooling, the two groups are quite similar.
Columns (3) and (4) illustrate that residents of the West Bank who work in Israel are less likely to live in an urban area, are younger, and less educated compared to the population of West Bank residents. Residents of Gaza that work in Israel are more likely to be married and older but less educated than the population of Gaza residents. Table 2 between Palestinian workers in Israel and the population as a whole, by region, are broadly reflective of Israel's work permit policy for Palestinians and the relatively tighter border controls in Gaza. Including these background characteristics in the regressions will, in fact, help capture the influence of Israel's Palestinian work permit policy, since the issuance of work permits to Palestinians is mostly based on these observed characteristics. To the extent that Palestinian work permits are also a function of unobserved characteristics, which have a direct influence on Palestinian employment outcomes, the effect of foreign worker permits and temporary closures will be confounded with Palestinian work permit restrictions since these policies are likely to be correlated.
The differences in characteristics in
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A defining aspect of Palestinian employment in Israel is its concentration in a small number of employment sectors, and in low skill occupations. The two top panels of Table   3 
Foreign Workers
The quarterly time series data on the total number of foreign workers in Israel that we use were collected by the Israel Central Bureau of Statistics (ICBS). In constructing the total number of foreign workers (legal and illegal), the ICBS takes into account the date of entry into Israel, the date of exit, and the country of origin of individuals that received work permits or tourist visas. The ICBS measure of the total number of foreign workers thus includes both legal permit holders and illegal immigrants.
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The bottom panel of Table 3 shows the distribution of foreign worker employment in Israel. Note that foreign workers are concentrated in construction, agriculture and services (household services). Thus, there is a substantial overlap in sector of employment in Israel between Palestinians and foreign workers. The overwhelming majority of foreign workers are also employed in low skill occupations. The main mismatch in the employment distribution between Palestinians and foreign workers is in the manufacturing and household services sectors. Nonetheless, Table 3 clearly indicates a substantial amount of competition between the two types of labor input.
It should be noted that in the empirical work that follows, we do not control for sector of employment in Israel because we do not have information on foreign worker permits by employment sector (the instrument), only aggregate numbers of permits in each quarter.
As a result, we may be slightly overstating the extent of competition between the two groups due to lack of more detailed data on foreign worker permits. The implication is that our estimated effects of foreign workers on Palestinian employment outcomes are likely to be somewhat conservative, or biased towards zero.
Regarding the total number of foreign workers in Israel, ICBS estimates indicate a relatively small number prior to 1994. In 1991, there were only 8,000 foreign workers in the country. In 1994, the number grew to 65,000 and by the end of 1995, there were about 120,000. Interestingly, the mean of 203,500 total foreign workers in Israel over the sample period can be decomposed into 131,500 illegal foreign workers and only 72,000 legal foreign workers (permit holders). According to data supplied to us by the Israel Ministry of Labor and Social Affairs, the mean number of permits issued over the sample period is 80,140 (with a standard deviation of 12,370), which exceeds the mean number of legal foreign workers. The relatively high proportion of illegal foreign workers in the Israeli labor market is generally thought to be a consequence of the wage premium that illegal foreign workers can capture in the informal market and the relatively low risk of deportation. Permit holders become illegal foreign workers when their permits are not renewed after expiration (permit length is usually two years) and they do not leave the country. They also become illegal when they accept employment with an employer other than the employer to whom the work permit was originally issued. For example, Israeli employers often file more employment requests than the market requires leading to delays in issuance that can last many months. There is also a lack of computerization and coordination between different authorities within the Ministry. These problems have led to work permits being issued for already finished construction projects, for projects that are not allowed to begin because of lack of proper building permits, and for planned harvests that are based on unverified reports by farmers. These rather well-documented lags and inefficiencies in the permit allocation process provide us with a source of exogenous variation in the total number of foreign workers present in the Israeli labor market.
In Figure 1 , we present graphical evidence on the relevance of our instrument. Figure 1 suggests a strong correlation between the number of permits issued each quarter and the total number of foreign workers. It is also clear that there is a sharp increase in the number of foreign worker permits issued, as well as total number of foreign workers in 
Estimation Strategy
The empirical model we use to measure the effect of foreign workers and closures on Palestinian employment outcomes is (1) Y it =α 0 +α 1 F t +α 2 C t +β β β βX it +ε it, where Y it is the employment outcome of individual i in quarter t. Y it is either a dummy indicating employment in Israel or the natural logarithm of monthly earnings. F t is the total number of foreign workers in Israel in quarter t and C t is the proportion of work days lost in quarter t due to closures. Note that including C t helps separate short-run lack of access to the Israeli labor market and long-term replacement by foreign workers. The vector X it includes years of schooling, age and age squared, as well as dummies indicating marital status, residence in an urban area, and residence in a refugee camp.
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Also included in X it are unrestricted quarterly and year effects. ε it is the error term.
Estimation of (1) is performed separately for residents of the West Bank and residents of the Gaza Strip.
In addition to estimating (1) by OLS, IV estimation of (1) is performed using the cumulative number of foreign worker permits issued as an instrument for the total number of foreign workers. The first stage in two-stage least squares estimation of (1) is thus, 10 These background characteristics are, to varying degrees, endogenous regressors. Unfortunately, we do not have additional valid instruments that could be used to assess the importance of the endogeneity problem here. As mentioned previously, inclusion of the background characteristics helps control for Israel's Palestinian work permit policy.
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(2) F t =π 0 +π 1 P t + π 2 C t +π π π π 3 X it +ξ it , where P t is the cumulative number of foreign worker permits issued through quarter t, since 1991. We use the number of permits issued in 1991 as an initial condition because it is the first year of data on permits at our disposal.
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The error term in (2), ξ it , is likely to be correlated with ε it in (1) because both error terms contain factors related to labor demand, and other macroeconomic factors, in Israel and the surrounding region.
12
For example, growth in the region as a whole could lead to voluntary movement of Palestinian laborers back into the local economies of the West Bank and Gaza Strip, and simultaneous increased entry of illegal foreign workers into the Israeli labor market. The exogeneity of P t rests on the assumption that administrative lags and inefficiencies in the issuance of foreign worker permits leads to "random" permit issuances. P t will also not be perfectly correlated with F t because of the availability of illegal foreign labor.
Because the random error component in (1) 
Estimation Results
Palestinian Employment in Israel
endogenous and noisy proxies. 13 Explicitly including dynamic considerations in (1), such as lagged employment status, would lead to a potentially severe missing data problem. This is a consequence of the sampling frame of the PLFS which skips two quarters. Thus, the data limit our ability to examine issues of state-dependence vs. unobserved 20 Table 4 presents estimates of the linear probability model for working in Israel described in the previous section. OLS estimates of the coefficient on foreign workers in Column IV estimates of the effect of foreign workers in Column (3) are much stronger than OLS estimates and are statistically significant. Note that the first stage estimates in Column (2) indicate that the permit instrument is highly relevant in both sub-samples. The fixedeffects coefficients on foreign workers in Column (4) are not substantially different from OLS estimates. However, fixed-effects estimates in Column (6), which exploit the permit instrument, yield the strongest estimated impact of foreign workers.
The IV fixed-effects coefficient of -.0086 in the top panel of Column (6) Table 5 Both of these coefficients are precisely estimated but are small in magnitude. As in the case of the effect of closures on employment rates in Israel, the direct, transitory impact of closures on mean monthly earnings is much weaker than the permanent impact of closures and long-run substitution by foreign workers.
Palestinian Monthly Earnings
Additional Results
Several additional estimation results, not displayed in Tables 4 and 5 effects. However, an extra year of schooling increases mean monthly earnings by only one-third of one percent. The estimated coefficients on age and age-squared are more substantial (the estimated coefficient on age is .048, and on age-squared it is -.0005).
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In the linear probability model for Palestinians from Gaza, IV fixed-effects estimates yield significant marital status, age, quarter and year effects. Older and married
Palestinians from Gaza are more likely to be employed in Israel, reflecting Israel's Palestinian work permit policy and tighter border controls in Gaza. In the log-linear model of monthly earnings determination, IV fixed-effects estimates yield significant schooling, age, marital status, quarter and year effects. The estimated return to schooling of 2.4% is much higher than for Palestinians from the West Bank, as is the marriage premium of 3.6%, and the concavity of the age-earnings profile (the coefficients on age and age-squared are .058 and -.0006, respectively). These additional results are consistent with earlier findings on the impact of background characteristics on Palestinian employment in Israel and Palestinian earnings using ICBS data on Palestinians (see Angrist (1992 Angrist ( ,1995 Angrist ( ,1996 Angrist ( ,1998 and Yashiv (2004) ).
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The Importance of Post-Displacement Earnings Information
In most studies of the impact of immigration on the earnings of natives, information on the employment outcomes of natives after displacement by immigrants is not available.
In this section, we simulate this common situation by restricting the sample to only Palestinians who are working in Israel. That is, the observed earnings information for many of these individuals who subsequently work in the local Palestinian economy is not included in estimation, as it is in Table 5 . This produces a selected sample and allows an assessment of the contribution of our post-displacement earnings data. In other words, we can quantify the extent of sample selection bias that would have arisen had the PCBS data set not been so rich. We perform this exercise only for Palestinians from the West
Bank since the resulting sample size for Palestinians from Gaza is rather small.
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The IV fixed-effects estimate of the impact of foreign workers in Column (6) of Table 6 , in the sample restricted to workers in Israel only, is .0058 and is not precisely estimated (the standard error is .0041). The results suggest that there is no significant change in mean earnings with the influx of foreign workers. This is in sharp contrast to the precisely estimated coefficient on foreign workers of -.0053 in Column (6) of Table 5 , which uses the earnings data in both economies. Thus, sample selection substantially biases upward the effect of "immigrants" on "natives" in this context, and substantially biases downward the labor market costs of the conflict. Note that the estimated effect of foreign workers is positive regardless of estimation technique (OLS, IV or fixed-effects).
Regarding the effect of closures on mean monthly earnings, the IV fixed-effects estimate of the impact of closures in the restricted sample remains significantly negative, as in the unrestricted sample. However, the estimated coefficient on closures in Table 6 is less negative than the corresponding estimate in Table 5 . In the restricted sample, the estimated coefficient on closures is -.0819. In the unrestricted sample it is -.0640. In this case as well, sample selection leads to a substantial bias, or underestimate of the labor 27 market costs of the conflict deriving from temporary closures.
Conclusion
In this paper, we contribute to the literature on the economic costs of political instability Our study also contributes to the immigration literature. We are able to overcome many of the problems associated with not being able to find significant negative effects of immigrants on the employment and earnings of natives. In the Israeli market for unskilled labor, Palestinians can be considered natives and foreign workers recent immigrants.
Identification of the effect of immigrants on natives in this case rests on the fact that 
